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Abstract 
 
Microfinance is arguably one of the most effective techniques for poverty 
alleviation in developing countries. Although traditionally supported by 
nongovernmental organizations and socially-oriented investors, microfinance has 
increasingly demonstrated its value on a stand-alone basis, typically exhibiting 
low default rates combined with attractive returns, encouraging greater 
commercial involvement. This paper addresses a related issue – whether 
microfinance represents a distinct financial asset class, thereby forming the basis 
for access to global capital markets and performance-driven investors in their 
search for efficient portfolios. Our empirical tests generally show very low 
correlations between the performance of microfinance institutions and global and 
national market performance measures, suggesting that microfinance portfolios 
may constitute a distinct asset class that can have useful portfolio diversification 
value. 
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*We are grateful to David Denoon, Richard Moxon, Brad Swanson and Paul Wachtel to helpful 
comments on various drafts of this paper. All errors are our own. 
Microfinance, traditionally supported by aid agencies and non-profit 
entities, has become a key tool in the alleviation of poverty in developing 
countries. In recent years, broader sources of funding have been tapped for 
microfinance, including client deposits of bank-related micro-lenders, 
refinancings via interbank deposits and commercial loans, and tapping the capital 
markets, the latter in the form of securitized portfolios of microloans that are 
marketed to institutional and private investors. Apart from any social benefit, the 
argument for commercialization of microfinance is that the default risk – 
comprising the likelihood of default, the loss given default (LGD), and expected 
recoveries (ER) – tends to be low relative to the returns, and that the risk-
adjusted total returns on microfinance exhibit low correlations to those of other 
asset classes, therefore presenting investors with an attractive opportunity for 
portfolio diversification. 
This paper focuses only on the latter issue, and examines empirically 
whether or not microfinance displays low correlations with global and local 
market movements. Part 1 considers the institutional transformation of 
microfinance from donor-driven non-governmental organizations (NGOs) towards 
market-based financial institutions – requiring adaptation of financing to 
commercial terms while at the same time avoiding mission-drift away from the 
goal of poverty-alleviation. Part 2 presents an empirical analysis of the systemic 
risk of microfinance institutions (MFIs) using emerging market commercial banks 
operating in the same national environments as a benchmark and correlating MFI 
returns against the S&P 500, MSCI Global and MSCI Emerging Markets indexes 
as proxies for global market risk and against domestic GDP as a proxy for 
domestic market risk. Since available data do not yet permit stress-testing our 
empirical results, we examine in Part 3 case-study evidence on the performance 
of MFIs in times of severe financial and macroeconomic distress. Part 4 provides 
a rationale for the empirical results obtained and suggests how these findings 
may change as the microfinance industry matures. Part 5 presents our 
conclusions. 
 3
 
1. Evolution of Microfinance 
 Approximately 10,000 MFIs have evolved worldwide over some three 
decades – in an amalgam of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
commercial banking entities, credit unions, cooperatives and finance companies 
– serving some 40 million clients worldwide.  
Total market demand for microfinance in 2005 was estimated at some 
$150 to $250 billion, as against total supply of just $10 to $15 billion.1 Scarce 
donor funding has been a key factor in limiting growth. Consequently, many MFIs 
have transformed themselves from mission-driven, often inefficient NGOs to 
regulated financial institutions partially or entirely funded by private capital. Apart 
from encouraging coherent reporting standards, credit ratings and viable industry 
associations, regulation brought new financing strategies to MFIs, including 
deposit-taking and the issuance of domestic and international securities.  
Deposits are generally the cheapest and most stable form of financing for 
MFIs that have acquired banking licenses,2 although the local savings pool is 
often insufficient to meet funding requirements. Enabling MFIs to additionally 
access capital markets allows them to finance growth on a larger scale. The 
longer maturity of capital market financing also strengthens the financial structure 
of MFIs, and may render them less vulnerable to external factors such as 
currency devaluations, bank runs and macroeconomic crises.3 Moreover, capital 
markets can significantly increase the efficiency of financial intermediation, and 
thus further decrease the financing costs of MFIs.4 
Since registering as a financial institution means adhering to more 
rigorous liquidity, capital adequacy and reporting standards, it does not make 
                                                 
1 Gil Crawford of MicroVest at March 20, 2006 Google Seminar “Microfinance Funds Make A 
Return: Investing for Social Impact” 
2 As of December 2003, the average cost of funds for deposit-taking MFIs was only 6.7%, 
compared to 10.1% for the others [von Stauffenberg, 2004] 
3 Issuing bonds not only diversifies, but also increases the average maturity of debt. Fundación 
Women’s World Banking (WWB), a non-governmental MFI in Colombia, reports that after it 
starting issuing bonds, the average maturity of its liabilities increased from 2.2 to 3.2 years 
[Accion, 2006] 
4For example, Fundación WWB reported that its average financing costs decreased after the 
issuance of bonds by 360 basis points. [Accion, 2006] 
 4
sense for all MFIs. This is especially true for institutions located in regions where 
operating costs are high and the local savings are minimal, or where 
governments set caps on lending rates for regulated financial entities.  
A number of MFIs have taken advantage of capital markets as an 
attractive alternative form of financing. The first institution was Compartamos in 
Mexico, which undertook a $68 million local-currency microfinance bond issue in 
2002. The first international microfinance security, a $40 million securitization of 
cross-border loans to nine MFIs in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Southeast 
Asia, was structured by Developing World Markets in 2004. As of mid-2005, 
approximately $617 million had been raised through domestic and international 
microfinance capital market transactions. [Credit Suisse, 2005] 
What makes microfinance compelling from a commercial perspective are 
very low default rates, which for MFIs tend to fall between 1% and 3%5 [Easton, 
2005]. Worldwide, the leading MFIs are nearly twice as profitable as the leading 
commercial banks in their local environments [Littlefield and Holtman, 2005]. MFI 
transaction costs are much higher than in traditional commercial banking, but the 
high marginal productivity of capital expenditures undertaken by microfinance 
borrowers enable transaction costs to be reflected in the form of materially higher 
interest rates. Survey-based studies conducted in India, Kenya and the 
Philippines found that the average annual return on investments by 
microbusinesses ranged between 117 and 847 percent [Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor, 2002]. Experience in various developing countries generally 
suggests that microcredit recipients are capable of paying interest rates that 
allow MFIs to more than cover their costs. [Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor, 2004] 
Despite such evidence – together with significant progress by MFIs in 
terms of improved operating efficiency, establishment of industry standards, and 
the beginnings of capital market access – microfinance is not yet able to compete 
with other asset classes on a large scale. Investors appear to perceive 
                                                 
5 However, these values suffer from “survivorship bias.” The median value for the 283 MFIs used 
in the sample is 2.4% 
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microfinance as excessively risky relative to the returns it generates, partially due 
to a lack of available or reasonably-priced foreign exchange hedges, absence of 
a solid track record, poor reporting standards, heterogeneous products and 
inadequate liquidity. This is also true for dedicated microfinance funds, which 
generally invest in private and illiquid institutions, and are therefore unable to 
report pricing on a daily basis. Such problems generally disqualify microfinance 
as an investible asset class for most mutual funds and other institutional 
investors.6 
 
2. The Risk Profile of Microfinance Institutions 
No empirical studies investigating the systemic risk of microfinance have 
been conducted to date. Presumably due to data constraints, the only 
comparison of microfinance with capital market movements is contained in a 
study by Credit Suisse [2005], which estimates the net asset value (NAV) of 49 
MFIs as a function of scheduled interest payments. However, it fails to 
investigate the relationship of MFIs to broader market movements or to estimate 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Several academic papers have however 
analyzed the performance of MFIs during times of macroeconomic crises.7 
The standard approach to analyzing the correlation of an asset class with 
the market is to calculate the historical market beta – i.e. to regress the returns of 
an asset class over a certain period of time against the returns of a benchmark 
index. This approach is only possible for publicly traded financial instruments 
capable of being marked-to-market and generating a dataset with a sufficiently 
large number of observations. MFIs are virtually all private companies with no 
mark-to-market valuation, so it is not possible to obtain betas from historical 
securities prices.  
A second approach is estimation of a fundamental beta – analyzing the 
types of businesses in which a firm operates, identifying publicly traded firms in 
                                                 
6 However,  some of the more sophisticated funds actually have created pricing models which are 
in line with SEC regulations. 
7 Section 3 contains a literature review. 
 6
those businesses, and obtaining their regression betas as a proxy.8 This is 
likewise impossible in the case of MFIs, since microfinance is an emerging asset 
class with no comparable listed peer group.  
The only feasible approach in the case of microfinance institutions relies 
on   accounting earnings: Changes in earnings of a firm, on a quarterly or annual 
basis that can be related to changes in earnings of the market over a comparable 
period to arrive at an estimate of the accounting beta. This approach 
nevertheless suffers from biases due to earnings-smoothing by firms, and can be 
influenced by non-operating factors such as changes in depreciation or inventory 
valuation, and by the allocation of corporate expenses at the divisional level. 
Such issues can be addressed by using the net operating income (NOI) instead 
of earnings, since NOI tends to reflect more accurately the performance of an 
institution over a given time period. Many MFIs, however, continue to receive 
grants and subsidized funding from various sources, which dilutes their net 
operating income.9 Moreover, in times of financial distress donors are likely to 
step in to rescue an MFI, which can be compared to too-big-to-fail (TBTF) 
support of commercial banks.10  
A further problem is that annual data on MFIs is only available from 1998 
to 2004. Given the small number of company-specific observations (a maximum 
of 7), the resulting regressions will show low R2 values and high standard errors. 
Even if the R2 values for both commercial banks and MFIs suggest lower 
systemic risk than actually exists, it should be possible to derive meaningful 
conclusions regarding the relative market risk of MFIs if commercial banks are 
used as a benchmark.  
Since results of the aforementioned regressions will raise significant 
issues due to general problems associated with accounting betas and additional 
                                                 
 8 The beta of two assets put together is a weighted average of the individual asset betas, with 
the weights based on market values. Consequently, the beta for a firm is the weighted average of 
the betas of all the different businesses in which it is engaged.  
9 Although the level of subsidization measured as a percentage of the MFIs total assets is likely to 
be less than 5% on average for the sample group. 
10 [TBTF] is a term used to describe that large financial institutions are likely to be bailed out by 
national supervisory institutions in times of severe financial distress, given that their collapse 
could endanger the stability of the financial system. 
 7
caveats regarding data constraints, we further examine changes in five key 
variables: (1) return on equity and (2) profit margin - which we use as profitability 
indicators; (3) change in total assets and (4) change in gross loan portfolio - 
which indicate changes in the value of bank assets; and (5) loan portfolio at risk – 
i.e., over 30 days past-due – denoted here as PAR30, as an indicator of asset 
quality. 
These variables are assumed to capture key changes in the fundamental 
value of a financial institution, which ultimately defines its market value. If it can 
be shown that some of the key parameters are significantly more exposed to 
market movements for commercial banks than they are for MFIs, this would 
indicate that the latter are generally less exposed to systemic risk:11 
We test for profitability and asset growth, but cannot directly test for asset 
quality because comparable data for commercial banks are not available. We 
rely instead on several case-studies relating to MFI and commercial bank 
performance during macroeconomic crises. Jansson and Taborga [2000] note 
that three additional issues are fundamental for MFIs – liquidity, capital, and 
efficiency and productivity. They should not, however, affect the results of the 
analysis.12  
 
Selection of Variables 
We focus on key performance indicators with available comparable data 
for commercial banks, which we use as a benchmark for calibrating MFI risk. 
                                                 
11 Note that we are using for H1 of hypotheses 1.1 to 1.3 < instead of ≠ for illustrative purposes. 
The correct notation would be ≠. As we are conducting a two-tailed test, a result displaying 
significantly higher correlation for CBs implies ≠ as well as <. 
12 Since loans represent a very large percentage of MFI assets (the loan portfolio to total assets 
ratio is 78% in the sample) with very short average maturity, liquidity should not be a major 
concern regarding fundamental stability of MFIs as long as the portfolio quality does not 
deteriorate dramatically. Capital is an important measure, but since virtually all systemic changes 
in this category should be captured by changes in net operating income and PAR30, a lack of 
sufficient data in this category should not be a major concern. Finally, efficiency and productivity 
should not be heavily exposed to market impacts, as long as PAR30 remains within acceptable 
limits. 
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Portfolio at risk is included due to its significance in commercial banking.13 Return 
on assets (ROA) is excluded since this ratio is used to derive the net operating 
income of MFIs.  
Apart from exploring the relationship with the S&P 500 and Morgan 
Stanley Capital International (MSCI) world equity indexes index as proxies for 
global markets, we further analyze correlations with the MSCI Emerging Markets 
equity index and domestic GDP, respectively. Although country risk is partially 
diversifiable, domestic market risk should be a good indicator of the exposure to 
contagion risk. Saunders and Walter [2002] find that there is an increasingly 
predictable relationship among local and global factors, on the one-hand, and 
emerging market equity returns on the other. Emerging market crises in the 
1990s suggest that contagion risk is a key concern for international investors. All 
else equal, a country-diversified portfolio consisting of assets that show a higher 
correlation with the domestic economy will show higher leptokurtosis (“fat tails”) 
in the return distribution than the same portfolio with less domestic exposure.14 If 
it can be demonstrated that microfinance (apart from low correlations with the 
major market indexes) evidences low correlations with the domestic market, this 
would indicate that microfinance is less exposed to the risk of contagion. 
 
Dataset 
Data on the S&P 500, MSCI world equities and MSCI emerging market 
equities indexes were obtained from Bloomberg. Data on domestic GDP was 
obtained from the Economist Intelligence Unit. Data on MFIs was gathered from 
the MixMarket database covering the time period 1998-2004. 15 Although this 
database contains 621 MFIs, we include only data from the 283 MFIs with 
                                                 
13 The only data regarding portfolio quality of commercial banks available was on realized loan 
losses. This is a significantly different measure of asset quality which is highly influenced by 
accounting techniques. 
14 Leptokurtosis is detrimental to investors in that it is evidence that events that cause extremely 
negative returns (“perfect storms”) are more likely to appear than in a portfolio with normally 
distributed returns. 
15 MixMarket™ is a global, web-based, microfinance information platform.  It provides information 
on MFIs worldwide, public and private funds that invest in microfinance, MFI networks, raters and 
external evaluators, advisory firms, and governmental and regulatory agencies.  
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audited financial statements based in 65 emerging market countries. The 
applicable reporting standards are not entirely consistent across countries. The 
same problem arises for emerging market commercial banks. However, the 
precise reporting standards are not as important in correlation analysis as they 
would be in analysis of absolute levels, especially when using a fixed-effects 
model. More important is consistency within each institution and comparability 
between MFIs and commercial banks.  
For emerging market commercial banks we use available data from 
Bloomberg. We exclude institutions from NIC416 countries and Malaysia as well 
as the Gulf OPEC countries. MFIs do not operate in these countries.  Altogether, 
the database contains information for 105 commercial banks based in 22 
emerging market economies. (Exhibit 1) 
 
Methodology 
We use a fixed-effects model, which controls for differences in the levels 
of variables associated with individual institutions – a standard approach when 
dealing with panel data. As in any OLS regression model, the key assumption is 
that the impact of the independent variable is the same for a given type of 
financial institution (MFI or emerging market commercial bank). Other available 
models such as the random effects estimator may yield more precise results, but 
only at the expense of stronger assumptions – which in this case are certain to 
be excessively restrictive and contain a high risk of misspecification bias in the 
results.  
We use a two-step approach. First, we conduct an individual OLS 
regression for MFIs and commercial banks to estimate the regression coefficient 
and R2 value for each of the dependent variables. Second, we run an OLS 
regression with both types of institutions and an interaction term of a dummy 
variable for emerging market commercial banks and the explanatory variable. 
The significance level of the interaction term coefficient provides a direct test for 
differences between the two types of institutions. The findings are depicted in 
                                                 
16 South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore 
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Exhibits 2-5, showing the statistical significance of the regression coefficients (t-
values are in parentheses following the regression coefficient), and significant 
results are marked by the shaded fields. “Significance” is defined at the 95% 
level of confidence and “high significance” is defined at the 99% level of 
confidence. 
 
Correlation of Microfinance with Global Capital Markets 
The R2 values and regression coefficients obtained are relatively low.17 
One explanation is our use of accounting data, where accounting earnings tend 
to be smoothed relative to the underlying value of the company as accountants 
spread expenses and income over multiple periods. This reduces the apparent 
market-risk (R2) as well as the beta, since market impacts are not directly 
reflected in annual accounting results. Further, the substandard quality of the 
accounting data for both MFIs and emerging market commercial banks creates 
variation that cannot be explained by the model, and therefore lowers the R2. 
The percentage change in net operating income does not show a 
statistically significant correlation with the S&P 500 index for either MFIs or 
emerging market commercial banks, and the same holds true for the MSCI 
Emerging Markets index, although there is weak significance in the correlation 
between MFI financial results and the MSCI World Equities Index. However, 
there is a significant difference in the correlations for the two sets of firms with 
respect to the S&P 500 index. The low R2 shows that the explanatory power of 
the accounting beta regressions is very limited. 
MFIs also do not show significant correlation with the S&P 500 index with regard 
to their operating fundamentals – ROE, profit margin, total asset growth, loan 
portfolio growth, and asset quality. All R2 values are extremely low.18 MFIs show 
higher correlations on ROE and profit margins with the MSCI World and 
Emerging Market indexes. Emerging market commercial banks likewise do not 
                                                 
17 The median R-squared of companies listed on the NYSE was approximately 19% in 2000. This 
number has been obtained from regressions with historical market data though and thus is not 
directly comparable.  
18 However, the “real” R2 should be higher due to the use of accounting data 
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show a statistically significant correlation for the two profitability indicators ROE 
and profit margin. For both asset measures analyzed, emerging market 
commercial banks do show highly significant correlation with the S&P 500 index. 
Significant correlations for emerging market commercial banks is also evident for 
the MCSI World index in the case of profit margin, asset growth and loan portfolio 
growth, and for the MSCI Emerging Markets index for profit margin and asset 
growth.  
 
Correlation of Microfinance With the Domestic Economy 
We use gross domestic product as the appropriate independent variable 
for systemic risk associated with emerging market firms. The alternative, 
emerging market stock indexes, are often driven by very few locally listed firms 
and may not reflect the underlying economic performance of a country. In many 
emerging markets, betas are likely to be close to one for the large companies 
that dominate the local index and wildly variable for all other companies. 
Moreover, since some of the emerging market commercial banks in the sample 
are likely to represent significant parts of domestic stock markets, reverse 
causality could be a major problem associated with choosing domestic stock 
indices as the independent variable. Although the banking sector is an important 
driver of the economy, reverse causality should be of less concern with respect 
to GDP as the independent variable. Finally, it was only possible to gather 
accurate stock market information for approximately half of the 72 countries in 
our sample, which would have led to the loss of a large number of observations.  
 Net operating income. Domestically, changes in the net operating income 
of MFIs show no correlation with GDP movements. For commercial banks, on the 
other hand, more than 4% of the changes in the net operating income can be 
explained by changes in domestic GDP. Once again, it is important to note that 
the underlying market risk (R2) could be considerably higher, since the use of 
accounting data reduces the explanatory power of the model. For commercial 
banks, net operating income declines by 11.25% for every 1% drop in GDP. 
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Furthermore, with a 99% level of confidence commercial banks co-move more 
with changes in GDP than MFIs. 
Fundamentals. The fundamental parameters of MFIs show significant 
correlation for two of the five parameters tested – ROE and portfolio at risk. The 
signs of these coefficients are as expected, showing cyclical behavior. Emerging 
market commercial banks show highly significant coefficients for all five 
fundamental independent variables tested:19 ROE of emerging market 
commercial banks show significantly greater market risk, suggesting that their 
profitability is more exposed to systemic risk.  
 
3. Correlation of Microfinance in Times of Severe Macro Distress 
In order to gauge whether microfinance is resistant to domestic economic 
crises, we tested the impact of the macroeconomy on net operating income for 
GDP growth of less than 1%. Whereas market risk remains low for MFIs (0.16% 
with an insignificant negative coefficient) the market risk for commercial banks is 
much higher (17.3%), with a significance coefficient of 42.3.20 The number of 
observations, however, is small – 70 MFI and 77 commercial bank observations. 
Moreover, the result regarding commercial banks seems to be driven in large 
part by three institutions that show highly negative net operating income during 
times of a severe decline of growth. The data do not permit rigorous statistical 
stress-testing in this case. However, in an overview of the performance of MFIs 
during economic and financial crises in emerging markets, Gonzales and 
Rosenberg [2006] suggest that MFIs significantly outperform commercial banks. 
Studies by Jansson [2001] on Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, MicroRate [2004]  on 
Bolivia, Fonseca [2004] on Argentina, Ecuador and Bolivia, Duff and Phelps on 
Colombia [Aristizabal, 2006] and Patten, Rosengard and Johnston [2001] on 
Indonesia find that - although MFIs are not immune to macroeconomic shocks - 
they tend to be significantly less effected than commercial banks. Furthermore, 
MFIs seem to recover faster from times of economic distress than commercial 
                                                 
19 Please note that all observed regression coefficients are consistently higher for commercial 
banks as well 
20 T-test: 2.59 (95% confidence interval: 9 to 75.7) 
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banks. The correlation with major adverse market movements seems to differ 
among countries and types of microfinance institutions. 
Findings contained in these case-studies suggest that MFI portfolio quality 
is also less exposed to major adverse market movements than commercial 
banks, so future empirical work incorporating appropriate data for this parameter 
may show this to be the case.  
 
4. Why Microfinance is Different  
The preliminary empirical evidence suggests that MFIs are to a significant 
extent detached from major markets and from domestic macroeconomic 
conditions that affect the performance of conventional banks. Here we consider 
the source of these differences in risk exposure and the extent to which MFIs will 
be able to sustain this advantage as the microfinance industry matures. Although 
commercial banks and MFIs both focus on retail banking, their business models 
show significant differences affecting their market exposure, as summarized in 
Exhibit 6. 
 
Ownership and Governance 
Most emerging market commercial banks are publicly traded companies. 
Shareholders generally represent domestic and international portfolio investors. 
The lack of a dominant long-term investor base in most emerging markets is 
often associated with substantial stock market volatility in these countries, with 
local investors largely driven by technical trading strategies. International portfolio 
investors are highly sensitive to market signals, and emerging market crises have 
demonstrated their impact on local markets once cross-border capital flows 
suddenly reverse direction. One consequence of such sharp reductions in local 
market liquidity is often a dramatic drop in the value of listed companies which 
reduces the KMV “distance to default” of these institutions.21  
                                                 
21 The KMV model of default risk considers that the equity of a firm essentially represents a call 
option with an exercise price that is equal to the book value of the firm’s debt. The model 
calculates the probability of default based on the distance between the firm’s value and its debt. A 
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MFIs, on the other hand, are virtually all privately-held companies, with the 
main shareholders generally consisting of various kinds of institutions – both for-
profit and nonprofit investors who have a long-term strategic interest and are less 
driven by market forces. Jansson [2001] finds that strong ownership structures - 
with owners who have financial resources and sufficient equity status to closely 
monitor MFIs - is a key advantage.22 
 A second implication of a sudden decrease in local-market liquidity is that 
refinancing becomes increasingly difficult for commercial banks with asset-
liability maturity mismatches. Here again MFIs seem to have an advantage – i.e., 
continuous funding via international development agencies which understand the 
importance of this sector to the local economy [Fonseca, 2004] 
If MFIs increasingly become commercial enterprises that access domestic 
and international financial markets, the stability advantage in terms of ownership 
structures is likely to deteriorate. With respect to the 1997-98 Asia financial crisis, 
McGuire and Conroy [1998] find that microfinance appears to have suffered most 
where it was linked into the formal financial system and caught up in local 
financial crises. Commercial equity investments in microfinance thus far remain 
marginal, so that microfinance is likely to benefit at least in the medium-term from 
the sponsorship and monitoring by nonprofits and international aid organizations.  
 
Client Characteristics 
 MFIs target the “unbankable” – customers with very low income and 
virtually no collateral. Almost all microfinance customers represent 
“entrepreneurs” – generally one of the prerequisites of obtaining microfinance 
credit. This restriction, combined with clients’ awareness of the high productivity 
of early-stage capital expenditures, explains a significantly higher investment 
ratio for MFI customers. Investing instead of consuming can reduce exposure to 
market risk.  
                                                                                                                                                 
significant decline in the value of a company is associated with the risk of bankruptcy. See 
http://www.moodyskmv.com/. 
22 See also Franks (2000). 
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In addition to showing more resilience and a higher capacity to adapt 
[Fonseca, 2004] microentrepreneurs may be less integrated into the formal 
sector of the economy. Whereas commercial banking clients may be highly 
dependent on imported inputs, for example, microentrepreneurs may employ 
mainly domestically-produced goods and services, which render them less 
exposed to currency devaluation or imposition of exchange controls. Moreover, 
the tendency for customers to move “downmarket” to cheaper, domestically 
produced goods during times of economic stress may have a countercyclical 
effect on microentrepreneurs. Micro-borrowers may also value their access to 
credit more highly than ordinary commercial bank customers, since it may 
represent their only opportunity to access financial services [Patten, Rosengard 
and Johnston, 2001]. As Robinson [2001] points out, fewer alternative sources of 
financing increase repayment discipline, and thus may support the resilience of 
MFIs to financial crises. 
  Such MFI client characteristics are not necessarily permanent, and 
mission-drift away from the poorest – a strategy that may appear attractive in 
terms of increasing returns – potentially has a negative impact in terms of MFI 
exposure to systemic risk. Focusing on Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Thailand and South Asia during the 1997-98 Asia crisis, McGuire and Conroy 
[1998] find that countries with the greatest concentrations of poverty were 
materially less affected by the financial shock. They also find that MFIs focusing 
solely on the poor appear to have withstood the crisis better than lenders not 
specifically targeting the poor. Finally, an Inter-American Development Bank 
study on Bolivia [Rodriguez, 2002] finds that institutions serving principally or 
exclusively low-income women showed a higher degree of sustainability in times 
of crisis. Such evidence suggests that MFIs which continue to focus on the poor 
and maintain a deep understanding of, and close ties to, their customers may be 
able to preserve their resistance to macro crises. 
 
Product Characteristics 
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The average loan of a commercial bank is larger in size, bears a lower 
interest rate, and has a longer maturity than the average MFI loan. The first two 
characteristics should not have a major impact on systemic risk – i.e., the greater 
granularity of MFIs portfolios decrease their borrower-specific risk exposure. 
Loan maturity, on the other hand, influences the exposure to market risk. Retail 
banks are in general adversely affected by increases in interest rates, since their 
borrowing rate is highly flexible (often floating), whereas their lending rates tend 
to be “sticky”. A longer average maturity of outstanding loans increases this 
inflexibility. It reduces their capability to adjust lending terms or to temporarily 
reduce lending activity in case of unfavorable movements in interest rates. 
Differences in product characteristics again suggest that MFI mission-drift 
away from services to the poor would come at the expense of a higher exposure 
to systemic risk as against MFIs that continue to focus on small loans with short 
average maturities. 
 
Lending Techniques 
Microfinance lending differs from traditional commercial banking mainly in 
the lack of collateral. Since loan covenants such as pledges of collateral reduce 
exposure to credit risk, commercial banks seem to have an advantage in terms of 
portfolio quality. However, there are several “soft factors,” which can turn out to 
be more important than collateral, especially in countries with highly unstable and 
inefficient legal systems. Jansson [2001] explains the superior economic 
performance of MFIs during times of economic distress in terms of “close ties to 
and knowledge of borrowers and local markets, and solid screening and 
incentive mechanisms to identify and encourage good and strong clients.” A GTZ 
study finds that women, who represent a large percentage of MFI clients, tend to 
have above-average debt service reliability.23  While MFIs have a disadvantage 
with respect to collateral, they may thus have offsetting advantages with respect 
to screening and relationship management. Moreover, the very short periods 
                                                 
23 For cites to the relevant GTZ studies, see http://search.gtz.de/livelink-
ger/livelink.exe/1972878903. 
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between installments (usually weekly or bi-weekly) allow MFIs to carefully 
monitor portfolio quality and rapidly adjust their lending practices and liquidity if 
necessary.  
Whereas better enforcement of property rights and credit reporting 
standards will help MFIs increasingly secure loans with collateral, their strong 
local ties and commitment to serve the poor may support high portfolio quality 
even in times of financial distress. The “village-banking model”24 of lending 
principally or exclusively to low-income women appears to be important in 
reducing credit losses in times of financial distress. Marconi and Mosley [2005] 
find that organizations which provide savings, training and quasi-insurance 
services perform particularly well under stress conditions. 
 
 Differences in Operating Leverage 
Ceteris paribus, higher operating leverage results in greater earnings 
variability. Although reliable data on the relevant variables is unavailable for 
MFIs, our dataset indicates that commercial banks may have a higher 
operational leverage, since they tend to be more dependent on fee-based 
services such as investment management, mortgage-banking, transaction-
banking and credit card business.25 Apart from being more volatile [DeYoung and 
Roland, 1999], the input mix required to produce such financial services may 
generate higher fixed costs than those needed to provide traditional credit 
products. MFIs that diversify their activities may indeed reduce firm-specific risk, 
but adding business lines with higher fixed-costs will tend to increase their 
operating leverage and exposure to systemic risk.  
 
Differences in Financial Leverage 
                                                 
24 Community-run and community-focused credit and savings associations, particularly in areas 
untouched by the formal financial industry. The village banking method is highly participatory. It 
gives beneficiaries a voice and it involves them in the development process. Members not only 
receive loans, they form cohesive groups who manage and collect repayments on those loans, 
who save diligently and decide on ways to invest those savings, and progress together, forming 
networks for mutual support. (Source: www.villagebanking.org) 
25 the ratio of total loans to total assets averaged 78% for MFIs, while that of emerging market 
commercial banks averaged 53% during the period under study 
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Financial leverage has the same effect as operating leverage, since interest rate 
payments are part of the fixed obligations of a company. Thus, increased 
financial leverage tends to raise earnings volatility. Comparing the financial 
leverage of MFIs with the financial leverage of commercial banks26 suggests that 
the debt-equity ratio for MFIs averaged 2.5 while that for commercial banks 
averaged 7.5 during the period under study. A mean tax rate of 19% for both 
types of institutions suggests that MFIs would need an equity beta of 
approximately 2.3 times the equity beta of commercial banks to incur the same 
market risk exposure. 
Bank borrowing for 30 MFIs analyzed by MicroRate increased from 23% 
of their external financing in 1999 to 46% in 2004. Whereas NGOs usually find it 
difficult to borrow more than twice their equity, debt-to-equity ratios among 
regulated MFIs are comparable to those of commercial banks. As the industry 
matures and MFIs become regulated financial institutions, the differences in 
financial leverage between MFIs and commercial banks is likely to diminish. The 
positive impact of such an increase in financial leverage on MFIs – in terms of 
moving toward an optimum capital structure – and the resulting (potentially) 
higher growth and profitability comes at the expense of an increase in systemic 
risk.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has examined systemic risk associated with microfinance.  
MFIs generally show weaker correlation with major and emerging market equity 
indexes and with domestic GDP in their home countries that do commercial 
banks. The summary of findings is presented in Exhibit 8. Microfinance 
institutions in general seem to be significantly less exposed to market risk than 
developing country commercial banks in terms of key financial and operating 
metrics, which suggests that microfinance may form a distinctive financial asset 
                                                 
26 Since there are no data on financial leverage for institutions in the dataset, we used other 
sources. The average for MFIs was calculated from data obtained from Developing World 
Markets on 29 MFIs. For commercial banks, the ratio is a national average of U.S. commercial 
banks. Financial leverage is likely to be lower for emerging market banks since the leverage is 
usually a function of the creditworthiness – still, this figure ought to be a useful benchmark. 
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class.  We argue that the difference in market risk between microfinance and 
emerging market commercial banking is based on differences in ownership and 
governance, client and product characteristics, lending methodologies and the 
lower operational and financial leverage. 
 This study complements other research regarding the performance of 
MFIs, but is constrained by problems of data quality and applicable methodology. 
The absence of marked-to-market valuation and limited audited financial 
information for MFIs renders data quality the most important constraint to 
defensible empirical research in this area. With MFIs increasingly adhering to 
well-defined reporting standards, future studies may be able to confirm our 
results obtained at a higher level of confidence. 
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Exhibit 1
Description of the Dataset
Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Net operating Income 
% change 700 73.5% 44.4% 196% 597 18.6% 10.5% 139%
Return on Equity 1008 6.1% 9.3% 30.8% 659 9.5% 12.9% 32.4%
Profit Margin 1073 12.4% 13.9% 21.3% 841 9.9% 10.3% 13.2%
Total Assets % 
change 949 42.2% 35.7% 38% 600 7.9% 5.3% 20.1%
Loan Portfolio % 
change 929 47% 40% 41.2% 594 6.3% 4.3% 24.5%
Portfolio at Risk % 1070 3.7% 2.4% 3.9% N/A N/A N/A N/A
MFIs Commercial Banks
Dependent 
Variables
Dummy Coef.: 1.01 (2.00)**
(95% CI: .02 to 2.0)
r-sq:  0.0049
Dummy Coef.: .00 (0.01)
r-sq: 0.0016
Portfolio at Risk Coefficient: -.00 (-0.71) r-sq: 0.0006
Coefficient: .33 (1.04) 
r-sq: 0.0022
Coefficient: .04 (1.67)
r-sq: 0.0035
Coefficient: .04 (1.16)
r-sq: 0.0018
Coefficient: -.09 (-1.39)
r-sq: 0.0029Loan Portfolio % change
Coefficient: .04 (0.86)
r-sq: 0.0013
Coefficient: -.07 (-1.24)
r-sq:  0.0023
ROE
Net Operating Income
 % change
Coefficient: -.67 (-1.73)
r-sq: 0.0063
Profit Margin
Total Assets % change
N/A
Dummy Coefficient: -.01 (-0.39)
r-sq: 0.0034
Coefficient: .17 (4.01)***
(95% CI: .086 to .25)
r-sq: 0.0316
Dummy Coefficient: .23 (3.16)***
(95% CI: .089 to .379)
r-sq: 0.0089
N/A
Dummy Coefficient: .25 (2.90)***
(95% CI: .08 to .414)
r-sq: 0.0074
Coefficient: .16 (3.19)***
(95% CI:  .062 to .262)
r-sq: 0.0205
Coefficient: .03 (1.34)
r-sq: 0.0033
MFIs CBs MFIs vs. CBsDependent Variable
Exhibit 2
Correlations with S&P 500 Index
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Dummy Coef.: 0.85 (1.84)
r-sq:  0.0057
Dummy Coef.: -.03 (-0.54)
r-sq: 0.0028
Portfolio at Risk Coefficient: -.00 (-0.85) r-sq: 0.0009
Coefficient: .09 (0.32)
r-sq: 0.0002
Coefficient: .05 (2.19)**
(95% CI: .005 to .099)
r-sq: 0.0059 
Coefficient: .06 (1.96)**
(95% CI: -.000 to .112)
r-sq: 0.0053
Coefficient: -.08 (-1.31)
r-sq: 0.0026Loan Portfolio % change
Coefficient: .03 (0.66)
r-sq: 0.0008
Coefficient: -.06 (-1.16)
r-sq:  0.0020
ROE
Net Operating Income
 % change
Coefficient: -.76 (-2.05)**
r-sq: 0.0089
Profit Margin
Total Assets % change
N/A
Dummy Coefficient: -.01 (-0.31)
r-sq: 0.0064
Coefficient: .15 (3.94)***
(95% CI: .073 to .221)
r-sq: 0.0308
Dummy Coefficient: .21 (3.04)***
(95% CI: .073 to .34)
r-sq: 0.0084
N/A
Dummy Coefficient: .2 (2.53)**
(95% CI: .044 to .351)
r-sq: 0.0056
Coefficient: .12 (2.67)***
(95% CI: .032 to .212)
r-sq: 0.0146
Coefficient: .04 (2.09)**
(95% CI: .002 to .081)
r-sq: 0.0080
MFIs CBs MFIs vs. CBsDependent Variable
Exhibit 3
Correlations with MSCI World Equity Index
MFIs CBs MFIs vs. CBsDependent Variable
N/A
Dummy Coefficient: -.01 (-0.51)
r-sq: 0.0063
Coefficient: .08 (3.14)***
(95% CI: .029 to .125)
r-sq: 0.0198
Dummy Coefficient: .11 (2.32)**
(95% CI: .016 to .194)
r-sq: 0.0052
N/A
Dummy Coefficient: .1 (1.87)
r-sq: 0.0031
Coefficient: .05 (1.67)
r-sq: 0.0058
Coefficient: .02 (1.98)**
(95% CI: .000 to .048)
r-sq: 0.0072
Coefficient: -.03 (-0.82)
r-sq:  0.0010
ROE
Net Operating Income
 % change
Coefficient: -.45 (-1.75)
r-sq: 0.0065
Profit Margin
Total Assets % change
Dummy Coef.: 0.3 (0.98)
r-sq:  0.0047
Dummy Coef.: -.05 (-1.65)
r-sq: 0.0037
Portfolio at Risk Coefficient: -.00 (-0.41) r-sq: 0.0002
Coefficient: -.15 (-0.83) 
r-sq: 0.0014
Coefficient: .03 (2.21)**
(95% CI: .004 to .066)
r-sq: 0.0061
Coefficient: .05 (2.47)**
(95% CI: .01 to .085)
r-sq: 0.0084
Coefficient: -.05 (-1.19)
r-sq: 0.0022Loan Portfolio % change
Coefficient: -.01 (-0.2)
r-sq: 0.0001
Exhibit 4
Correlations with MSCI Emerging Markets Equity Index
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Profit Margin
Coefficient: .81 (3.44)***
(95% CI: .348 to 1.27)
r-sq: 0.0154
Coefficient: .99 (7.82)*** 
(95% CI: .74 to 1.24)
r-sq: 0.1017
Dummy Coef.: .18 (0.67)
r-sq: .0375
N/A
Coefficient: -.07 (-0.14)
r-sq: 0.0000
Coefficient: .49 (1.92)
r-sq: 0.0054
Coefficient: 11.25 (4.58)***
(95% CI:  6.43 to 16.07)
r-sq: 0.0412
Dummy Coef.: 12.76 (2.86)***
(95% CI: 4.00 to 21.51)
r-sq: 0.0162
Dummy Coef.: .75 (2.00)**
(95% CI: .01 to 1.49)
r-sq: 0.0284
Dependent Variable MFIs CBs MFIs vs. CBs
ROE
Net Operating Income
 % change
Coefficient: -1.51 (-0.39)
r-sq: 0.0003
Coefficient: 1.24 (4.88)***
(95% CI: .74 to 1.73)
r-sq: 0.0431
Portfolio at Risk
Coefficient: -.13 (-3.23)***
(95% CI: -.21 to -.05)
r-sq: 0.0137
Dummy Coef.: 1.01 (1.64)
r-sq: 0.0041Total Assets % change
Coefficient: .94 (2.85)***
(95% CI: .29 to 1.59)
r-sq: 0.0164
Loan Portfolio % change
Coefficient: 2.17 (5.59)***
(95% CI: 1.41 to 2.94)
r-sq: 0.0608
Coefficient: 1.00 (1.76)
r-sq: 0.0050
Dummy Coef.: 1.17 (1.65)
r-sq: 0.0205
N/A
Exhibit 5
Correlations with Domestic GDP
Exhibit 6
Why Microfinance May Be Different
Source: Tor Jansson, “Microfinance: From Village to Wall Street”, Inter-American Development Bank, 2001.
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Exhibit 8
Summary of Statistical Results 
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